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“A Bunch of Tough Hombres”: Police Brutality,
Municipal Politics, and Racism in South
Texas
B r e n t M. S. C a m p n e y
“Everybody knew the McAllen police were a bunch of tough hombres,
especially the Boys on C shift,” reported the Dallas Morning News on
March 29, 1981. “Working the midnight-to-8 a.m. shift along the border
is like being at war, the cops said. You have to be tough. The Boys on
C shift worked at being tough.” Many of the “Boys” wore black T-shirts
with gold letters bearing “the legend, ‘C Shift Animals.’ They even had
their own slogan: ‘Kick…and Ask Questions Later.’ ” Only days earlier,
the public had become aware of their misdeeds, revealed in six years of
booking room videos recorded by the McAllen Police Department
(MPD) and subpoenaed by a civil rights attorney. On these videos Anglo
and Mexican American officers alike confirmed suspicions that they had
beaten, kicked, and abused prisoners—in virtually all cases, working-class
Mexican Americans.1
Station KGBT in nearby Harlingen played television footage of the
beatings, bringing a flood of outrage. “One woman, like many of the
callers, was almost in tears when she thanked us over and over again for
showing such terrible things going on,” noted a representative of the
station. “She said as soon as she got through talking to us, she was going
to call the McAllen police to demand an answer [as to] why those things
had happened.”2 She was not alone. “The police switchboard was lit up
for hours after the tapes were shown on TV,” declared James C.
Harrington, the attorney for the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU),
which had secured the videos and released them to the media.3 As
investigators probed the scandal, some pointed to the mayor—already
locked in a heated, racially tinged political race with Ramiro Casso, a
Mexican American challenger—as an enabler. On May 3 the News
reported that “the federal grand jury investigation of accusations of
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brutality by McAllen police has broadened to include the possibility of
a cover-up of the incidents by Mayor Othal Brand and other city officials.”4
This study tells the story of the 1981 MPD scandal, its impact on the
ongoing municipal election between an Anglo incumbent and a Mexican
American challenger, and its role in unifying Mexican Americans in South
Texas during a period in which they were beginning to seize the reigns
of local and regional power. Historians such as David Montejano, Marc
Simon Rodriguez, and Brian Behnken have incorporated the issue of
police brutality into their scholarship on the Mexican American civil rights
movement during the post World War II period. In his discussion of
Colorado, for example, Rodriguez found that between “1962 and 1964,
police brutality became a significant issue for Mexican Americans in
Denver and was the spark that ignited community activism. Several young
men had had interactions with the police, and what should have been no
more than minor skirmishes led to the young men’s deaths.”5 Nevertheless,
historians have focused on particularly egregious incidents in places like
East Los Angeles and Dallas rather than on the issue of police violence
more broadly. This study places police violence at the center of the story
and addresses its significance in enforcing repression, promoting resistance,
and transforming local and regional power relations.6
The study proceeds in five sections. In the first it details the history
of police violence against Mexican Americans in Texas and in the Lower
Rio Grande Valley (hereafter, the Valley) in the 1970s. In the second
section it examines the role in these events of Othal Brand, the so-called
Onion King, who owned one of the most powerful agribusiness interests
in Texas and served as the mayor of McAllen. In the third it analyzes the
MPD scandal, the roots of which dated back to the early 1970s. In the
fourth it explores the mayoral campaign, election, and election runoff,
all of which not only highlighted the police scandal but underlined racial
and class divisions in this South Texas city. In the final section it considers
the historiographical implications of its findings.
To tell this story, I draw upon an array of sources. Among these I
include news reports, interviews, and editorials in local and regional Anglo
newspapers, particularly the McAllen Monitor and the Dallas Morning
News; articles and advertisements published in the popular magazine
Texas Monthly; and material printed in the farmworkers newsletter, El
Cuhamil, published in nearby San Juan. I also employ the collected papers
of Ramiro Casso, a Mexican American doctor and civil rights leader, and
a long-term political and ideological opponent of Brand.

Hombres   ✜  789
In 1980 McAllen was a Valley city of some 66,000 residents located
in the heart of the South Texas citrus belt. “This sunbaked city hugs the
Mexican border along the Rio Grande River at the bottom of what is
known here simply as the Valley, a vast expanse of Texas that sweeps
down from San Antonio through hostile ranch land until palm trees
dominate the skyline and citrus trees nurture the economy,” wrote the
Washington Post in 1981. “At dark, along the highway that runs north
out of McAllen, the lights burn brightly at the processing plants, and
the fragrance of onions and cantaloupe sweetens the warm tropical air.
The odor is powerful in its freshness, seductive as it hangs in the humid
night.”7 Between 1970 and 1980, McAllen had increased in size from
just 37,636 residents to 66,281, 70 percent of them Mexican American.8
McAllen was the business capital of the Valley and, after Brownsville,
its largest city. It was founded in 1904 after the construction of a new
railroad connecting the region to the national market. Over the following
decade Anglo farmers invaded the area and, using the twin levers of fraud
and violence, gained control of the ranch lands largely controlled
heretofore by Mexican American cattle ranchers. After dispossessing the
Mexican Americans, they put many of them to work as stoop-laborers
in the new agricultural empire that they created. Following a series of
1915 raids by a small network of ethnic Mexican revolutionaries eager
to drive out the Anglos and reclaim their lands, the Anglos consolidated
their control with a massacre in which hastily deputized Texas Rangers
and lynch mobs killed hundreds of persons of Mexican descent, if not
more. In the years thereafter, they imposed increasingly harsh Jim Crow
measures to chain Mexican Americans to the bottom of the social order.9
Throughout the balance of the twentieth century, Mexican Americans
challenged the Anglo order. Following the aforementioned massacre in
1915, Brownsville State Representative J. T. Canales, an influential
Mexican American, pressed vigorously for an investigation into the
conduct of the Texas Rangers, an inquiry which led to the eventual
restructuring of that police organization. In 1929 elite Mexican American
men formed the League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC)
in Corpus Christi and, despite its initial (and enduring) classist and sexist
orientation, they fought with vigor to overthrow racist practices across
the state and to open new opportunities for their people. From the 1930s
to the 1950s, LULAC used political and economic pressure, as well as
court challenges, to compel Anglo leaders to abandon their proscriptions
against Mexican Americans in virtually all realms of life, efforts that bore
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some (often short-term) benefits. To their frustration, however, Mexican
Americans routinely discovered that Anglos had once again resurrected
the Jim Crow indignities previously negotiated away.10
After World War II, and particularly during the late 1960s and early
1970s, Mexican Americans challenged Jim Crow with a broader-based and
more confrontational approach. “Organizers during the 1960s began
challenging segregated school systems and city councils, making neverbefore-seen inroads for South Texas Mexicans,” wrote historian Timothy
Paul Bowman.11 On June 1, 1966, hundreds of Mexican American
farmworkers organized one of the largest strikes ever undertaken in the
region. After striking for a month, they then undertook a “nearly fivehundred-mile Minimum Wage March” to Austin “to garner media attention
for the plight of the laborers.”12 With such efforts, they made some gains.
Nonetheless, many Anglos still insisted well into the 1970s that their
“Mexicans” were generally satisfied with their circumstances. At the same
time, however, they revealed increasing bitterness that some “Mexicans”
had begun expressing openly their intolerance of the status quo.
Anglos claimed to be surprised, therefore, when the freedom struggle
revealed smoldering anger. In 1970 a woman in Mathis felt betrayed by
what she perceived as an inexplicable turn against Anglos by ungrateful
Mexican Americans, whom she called “Mexicans.” Mathis was “a
wonderful little town with lots of good people in it, Mexicans and
Anglos,” she said. “It was a wonderful town, that is,” until Mexican
Americans and a few Anglos organized their own candidate for mayor.
She charged that the civil rights movement “really has no purpose. The
majority of Mexicans don’t want it. Just some of the young. The problem
isn’t the older Mexican. It’s the young ones,” whom she decried as
communists. She feared that a few troublemakers had spoiled the good
ones. “The Mexican was really making progress,” she mourned. “I’ve
seen them progress so far in their methods of eating, sleeping, drinking—
those things. They have come a long way. I don’t look down on them
because some of my best friends are Mexicans.”13
Rather than admit that they had long enforced Jim Crow and consider,
perhaps, ways that they might atone for that injustice, many Anglos
remembered—falsely, of course—that both Anglos and Mexican
Americans alike had been happy with the status quo until the mid-1960s
when the latter made unjustifiable demands and stirred up ugliness. An
Anglo made this point in 1981 as she fondly recalled the 1960s when,
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“if we can all reflect back that far, the people of McAllen and the entire
Valley lived together in harmony side by side REGARDLESS of whether
we were ‘gringos’ or ‘Mexicans’ ”—a memory plainly inconsistent with
that held by many Mexican Americans.14

This sensational image indicates the level of inter-racial friction in the Valley
during the study period and the sort of racist animosity directed at persons
of Mexican descent. Image in “Vigilantes along the Border,” reproduced in
El Cuhamil, November 5, 1977, p. 1. Courtesy of Library Special Collections
& University Archives, University of Texas Rio Grande Valley.

Police Violence

in

Texas

and the

Rio Grande Valley

In the 1970s, violence against working-class Mexican Americans by
local police officers was a major—if unsurprising—issue in Texas during
a period of vigorous Chicano activism. It was very common indeed in
the Rio Grande Valley. On December 10, 1970, Deputy Sheriff Nem
Jennings Bryan killed fourteen-year-old Victor Manuel Nava in
Brownsville. He claimed that he spotted some youths sniffing glue in an
alley and gave chase until compelled to defend himself. “Bryan said after
the shooting he fired only after Nava lunged at him with what Bryan
thought was a knife,” reported the News. “However, no knife was
found.”15 Despite the supposed lunge, Bryan “shot Nava in the back of
the head.”16 Nevertheless, the state grand jury declined to prosecute
and the authorities in Cameron County refused to investigate.
Once it became clear that the Texas authorities would do nothing,
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the Justice Department assumed responsibility. “U.S. Attorney Anthony
J. P. Farris has ordered the FBI to investigate,” a reporter noted. “ ‘As
is our policy, we waited until the matter was handled locally,’ Farris said.
‘It is apparent there was no vigorous prosecution of the case.’ ”17 A
federal grand jury soon indicted Bryan for violating Nava’s civil rights
by depriving him of his life without due process. At the April trial,
however, Bryan won an easy acquittal. Evidently, the jury agreed with
the defense attorney who “accused the Justice Department in final
arguments of putting ‘lying little glue sniffers’ on the stand to testify
against Bryan.” In making their decision, the jurors deliberated for just
forty-four minutes.18
Less than three months after the Nava killing, Mexican American
youths “picketed the Pharr police station to protest the beating of two
Chicanos in the jailhouse,” explained the Grito del Norte.19 Alerted to
the protest, police from neighboring Edinburg and McAllen, and state
troopers from Harlingen, hurried to assist their fellows. Unsuccessful in
dispersing the crowd, they appealed to the Pharr fire department to
deploy water hoses. When some of the youths responded with projectiles,
the officers reacted with a full-scale charge, sweeping through the main
streets, firing guns into the air. Before the night was over, they had turned
the “street in front of the police station [into a] scene of broken glass,
hurled rocks, tear gas and discharging riot guns.”20
During the chaos an officer shot and killed Alfonso Flores, an innocent
victim who had simply exited a shop. In addition, the police arrested
dozens of youths.21 “Another Chicano brother has been murdered by
police,” thundered the Grito del Norte. “Flores was shot in the head as
he stood watching over 100 Texas Rangers, Highway Patrolmen and
police sweep through the [Pharr] barrios using tear gas, clubs and guns
against the terrorized people.”22 After addressing a thousand students
at Pan American College in neighboring Edinburg, national Mexican
American civil rights activist César Chávez, coincidentally visiting the
area, commented on the riot. “‘We can’t tolerate that kind of action by
the Pharr police. They (the demonstrators) wanted to protest widespread
police brutality and it escalated into a demonstration.”23
Although the violence attributed to the MPD lacked the drama which
attracted attention to the killings of Mexican Americans in Brownsville
and Pharr, McAllen was the epicenter of police violence in the Valley. In
the 1970s it provided “many young men along the border” with a “bitter
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lesson” of its widespread reputation for unwarranted violence by its
police officers.24 As the Dallas Morning News reported, “the troubled
police department in McAllen…has been the target of numerous
complaints of brutality and misconduct since 1976.”25 Reviewing the
history of beatings when the video record surfaced in 1981, State
Representative Arnold Gonzales, a Democrat from Corpus Christi,
probably spoke for many Mexican Americans when he declared: “I ain’t
ever going to go to McAllen.”26
Almost by definition, officers served the interests of Anglos and,
particularly, the middle- to upper-class Anglos who ran the city.
Furthermore, many of the assaulting officers were Anglos. However,
when empowered with a badge, Mexican Americans could exhibit the
same behavior, knowing that they too could avoid the consequences
and, at the same time perhaps, ingratiate themselves with Anglos.
Furthermore, as historians recognize, some Mexican Americans—
particularly the more prosperous ones—shared Anglo contempt for poor
and working-class Mexican Americans. In his remarks after the Pharr
riot, César Chávez made this point: “Mexicans can be just as brutal as
Anglos.”27 After the reports of the violence in McAllen, an observer
suggested that it “wasn’t necessarily a racial issue.” The videos showed
“that Mexican cops and Anglo cops were involved in beating prisoners.
Of course, the prisoners they were beating were all Hispanics. That’s
[also] very clear.”28 T. F. Rocha, a resident of McAllen, expressed anger
at the racism and classism on vivid display. “Those police officers acted
like a bunch of cowards beating up poor Mexican-Americans,” he
observed. “They were mostly arrested because they were poor and
Mexican-Americans, and because these cops probably thought they could
get away with [it].”29

The Onion King
“McAllen Mayor Othal Brand, the self-proclaimed onion king, knew
he didn’t want to be poor when he grew up,” wrote reporter David
Sedeno in a 1985 profile. The “multi-millionaire agribusinessman doesn’t
have to worry too much about money; in fact he is divesting much of
his personal estate.”30 As the chairman of Griffin & Brand, a citrus and
vegetable packing company, Brand advised American presidents and
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Texas governors, was a philanthropist, and held honorary doctorates
even though he had never completed high school. “Othal Brand could
have stepped out of the pages of a Horatio Alger novel,” summarized
Texas Monthly.31
Born poor in Georgia in 1919, Brand was peddling produce at ten
years of age and went into business for himself at sixteen. Crisscrossing
the country as a produce buyer in 1938, he “journeyed for the first time
to the Rio Grande Valley, from where one day he would run his empire.”
He served as a marine in World War II and married in 1945. Following
his military service, he returned to his business activities in Atlanta.32
However, on numerous occasions thereafter he visited the “tropical Rio
Grande Valley, the ‘Magic Valley’ where crops flourish year-round. He
scoured the countryside, buying up dozens of acres here and there. In
1953, after more than ten years of shuttling back and forth between
Georgia and the Valley, Brand and his family moved to Texas permanently
and built an agricultural empire that now spans the globe. He owns
40,000 acres in Texas, Colorado, Idaho, and California. No matter the
time of year, the conveyor belts at Brand’s huge McAllen packing plant
are laden with onions, cabbage, cantaloupes, bell peppers, or
strawberries.”33 By the mid-1980s, he had built a business with a value
estimated at $77 million.34
Tall, muscular, and athletic, Brand was a devout Southern Baptist and
Sunday school teacher who “hates high-ranking state Democrats, liberals
and union activists.” Focused, self-righteous, and strong-willed, he
directed his attention initially to his business, which prospered along with
his adopted and rapidly growing South Texas hometown. Within a decade
of his arrival there he turned his attention to active political engagement.35
Beginning in 1960, he served on the school board, a tenure marked “by
temper tantrums when members didn’t go along with him,” noted Texas
Monthly. “In fact, once Brand became so angry at a board member who
voted against a pet project that he struck the man.”36
After eight years on the school board he served four years on the city
commission before ousting the “establishment” incumbent mayor in
1977. Although he remained controversial, he would retain his mayoral
position for the next twenty years. In his 1985 article Sedeno indicated
that Brand, an Anglo, was serving his “third term as mayor in a city
where Mexican Americans make up 85 percent of the population but a
Hispanic has never been elected mayor.” Although many residents—
particularly the Mexican Americans—remained poor, Brand helped to
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transform McAllen into a juggernaut, boasting that he was building the
“greatest city in South Texas.” Indeed, he was. Between 1980 and 1985
the population there increased by more than 20 percent and, with its
subtropical climate, U.S. News & World Report named it “one of the 10
best U.S. cities in which to retire.” As Brand put it: “I’m a doer. I like
to build things.” He admitted that he had done things that he regretted
but he believed that on the whole his life had “been one of contribution
to society, to my nation and to God.”37
For all his accomplishments, critics charged, “Brand also has another
side.”38 Fellow Anglo politicians and businessmen grumbled that the
notoriously independent Brand acted without concern for their views.
Campaigning against him in 1981, fellow mayoral candidate Mike
Frost—who represented the Anglo establishment overthrown by Brand—
captured a widespread criticism. “McAllen needs cooperation and
leadership, and isn’t getting much of either from its current mayor,” he
told supporters. “The trouble with Othal Brand is that he doesn’t know
what the word ‘we’ means.”39 Making this the theme of his campaign,
Frost charged that for “four years, McAllen has been ruled by ‘The Law
According to Othal Brand.’ ” This, he asserted, was “the same law that
repeatedly cuts citizens short at City Commission meetings” and that
this was the time to “elect a mayor who respects the law and the wishes
of the people.”40
Mexican Americans, and particularly the working-class majority,
charged that Brand had “forgotten the poor, intimidates farmworkers,
is a bully, a racist.” ACLU attorney Harrington, who had “sued Brand
countless times on behalf of farmworkers,” viewed the Onion King as a
prime exploiter of Mexican American and undocumented Mexican labor.
Brand, he claimed, had “a real violent tendency especially to those who
disagree with him. He can be very vindictive.” He added that “farmworkers
in the Valley fear Brand, who insists he’s the farmworker’s best friend.”
Brand rejected the racist label but did not dispute Harrington’s charge
that he liked to get even: “I don’t forget injustices…. I just mark it in
the back of my mind and catalog it. But I don’t forget.”41 In 1981 a
labor organizer described Brand as “Mr. Agribusiness,” the local
“spokesman against collective bargaining rights for workers.”42 Texas
Monthly acknowledged that there was “a lot of bad blood—and lawsuits—
between Brand and the farmworker organizers. He is perhaps their most
formidable obstacle.”43
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This cartoon image of Othal Brand depicts the wealthy Anglo businessman
and politician as an octopus, with his eight money-clutching tentacles
involved in nearly every aspect of the local social order. From El Cuhamil,
last issue of 1979, p. 3. Courtesy of Library Special Collections & University
Archives, University of Texas Rio Grande Valley.
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Brand revealed his tough side in a 1975 skirmish with farmworkers
who were working “feverishly to organize a union.” During a wildcat
strike by melon workers, in which organizers of the United Farm Workers
played a significant role, “a television crew filmed Brand as he jumped
out of his pickup truck waving a pistol at strikers on his land,” reported
Texas Monthly.44 The Valley Morning Star claimed that Brand did not
actually “leap out” of the vehicle but did draw a pistol. “There’s an
injunction against these people and if the police won’t move them off
my land, I’ll move them off,” he reckoned.45 He later boasted that “I’d
do it again today.” He reasoned that “a bunch of people out there with
rifles and sticks” were threatening his family, his workers, and himself,
and that under such circumstances he would stand firm.46 When onion
workers struck against another grower in nearby Raymondville in 1979,
“Brand marched in with his own workers and harvested his part of the
crop, crippling the strike.”47
As the mayor of McAllen in 1978, Brand again demonstrated his
toughness when Anglo farmers from the Midwest and South converged
on the International Bridge in Hidalgo, south of McAllen, to protest
the importation of Mexican produce, which, they claimed, constituted
unfair competition and contained banned pesticides. Although Brand
himself prompted the protest by publicly admitting that he had himself
imported such crops, he and other officials dispatched a hundred officers,
mostly from McAllen, who lobbed tear gas canisters and clubbed farmers
within “15 seconds” of engaging them. The officers arrested two hundred
farmers and sent some of them to the hospital. Brand arrived after the
“arrests and claimed farmers had violated their agreement to protest
peacefully for only five minutes.” When the farmers denied that they had
made any such agreement, he retorted that their word was not “worth
a plug nickel.” As officers herded the farmers onto buses, “trucks loaded
with Mexican produce began rolling past—less than 50 feet away.”48
Shortly thereafter, the McAllen city commissioners unanimously passed
a resolution—introduced by a councilman who was “a lower Rio Grande
valley grower, and supported strongly by Mayor Othal Brand”—which
commended the police force for its methods. The resolution won
unanimous approval.49
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MPD P o l i c e S c a n d a l
During Brand’s tenure as mayor, the MPD earned a reputation for
violence toward working-class Mexican Americans, although the evidence
suggests that this misconduct was well established much earlier. “During
the last five years, numerous suits have been filed against the McAllen
police charging brutality and undue force,” reported the Dallas Morning
News in March 1981. “In the last year alone, the City of McAllen has
paid $400,000 in settlements or judgments on those suits—an average
of $5 for each citizen.”50 Harrington, the ACLU attorney, charged that
“the City of McAllen has a long history of police misconduct, that city
and police officials knew about it and that they failed to take steps to
correct it.”51 There was “a custom in McAllen of police misconduct,”
he argued, and, although this “ ‘custom’ wasn’t in writing, ‘it was just
as strong and had as much force as something in writing.’ ”52
In many instances the offending officers—Anglo and Mexican American
alike—were the aforementioned members of the self-proclaimed “C Shift
Animals.” They were so confident of their right to perpetrate these offenses
that they did so in front of a video camera posted over the booking area.
Once publicly released, the videotapes showed that “the men on C shift,
in a systematic pattern during the last six years, had beaten, kicked and
abused prisoners in their custody for no apparent reason.” One of the
tapes “showed an officer beat and pummel a prisoner, then grab him by
the hair and smash his face repeatedly into the booking desk.”53
In subsequent court proceedings, officers flatly denied that they were
responsible; they testified instead that they were “trained to ‘get even’
with prisoners who dished out verbal or physical abuse.” A sixteen-year
veteran and “former commander of the late-night ‘C’ shift” told the
court that his officers “ ‘exiled themselves from the community,’ and
abuse became a trademark of their exile. He said officers on the shift had
earned a bad reputation.” In addition, he admitted the impact of this
culture on new officers. “A lot of officers took action out of peer
pressure—you must do it to belong.”54 Another witness testified that an
officer who trained new recruits told them “to ‘throw (your) weight
around as much as you like,’ and ‘if an ol’ boy falls and busts his face on
a curb, well, that’s just too bad.’ ”55
In addition to these beatings, MPD officers committed other violations.
One testified in court that “the telephone prisoners used to call their
attorneys is tapped and the conversations are recorded,” a procedure
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that a disgusted observer called “a gross indiscretion and illegal as it can
be.”56 In an incident captured on video, officers told a man arrested for
drunkenness in 1979 “that officers would keep a marijuana cigarette
found on the suspect and charge him only with intoxication.” On the
video “the men talk about the cigarette. Then one of the officers tells
[the prisoner] ‘We’ll just keep the grass and charge you for DWI (driving
while intoxicated).’ ” Not surprisingly, the records clerk could find only
the DWI charge and no record of the marijuana; the officers had not
placed the drug into evidence, suggesting that they may have smoked it
themselves.57 In an incident in 1978, an officer “allegedly took a prisoner
to a flower bed in the rear of headquarters…and stomped the individual.”
At the time the officer involved was slated to “be promoted to lieutenant
in charge of traffic.”58
In addition to the beatings, internal documents suggest that some
officers engaged in sexual offenses against those whom they were supposed
to protect. One patrol officer “spotted a couple making love in the back
seat of an automobile,” noted a 1978 memo:
The officer walked up to the couple with a flashlight and made the
nude male stand in front of the vehicle lights. He then entered the
vehicle and asked the nude female to open her legs to search for
evidence. He refused to let the female put on her underwear and
confiscated the underwear as evidence. (The evidence and unfiled
reports were supposedly found in [the officer’s]…P.D. locker.)
On a second incident, the same officer stopped a female on a D.W.I
charge. The officer supposedly offered to follow the female home.
The female got into the car and a high speed chase ensued into
the City of Pharr. The female was handcuffed and the tube-top
blouse she was wearing was down around her waist. She has allegedly complained that the officer had no right to fondle her breasts
after removing her blouse.59
Critics charged that Mayor Brand was “aware as early as 1977 of
widespread brutality by McAllen police.”60 Furthermore, in a 1978
memo, Officer Gary Miller wrote that “on or about July 24, 1978, Ruben
De Leon, Don Herzing and myself” met with high-ranking city officials
to discuss “what we felt were problem areas in the McAllen Police
Department,” problem areas that included the beating of prisoners.61
Amid a flurry of court cases in 1980–1981 in which he successfully
represented twenty-five of the twenty-six plaintiffs, Harrington indicated
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that “Brand had testified that he knew of the existence of the videotapes—
installed by the department to monitor the booking-desk area—and
what they showed ‘as far back as 1977.’ ” A year later, he charged that
seven officers met with the mayor “to inform him of misconduct by
fellow officers.” Harrington reported that “in 1979, the mayor also told
a supporter who complained about the treatment of a prisoner that he
had viewed videotapes taken at the police station.” Democratic state
senator Hector Uribe alleged that officers had officially informed Brand
of the brutality by officers in 1978. Uribe indicated that he was
“ ‘extremely concerned’ about reports that private telephone conversations
between attorneys and their clients were tape-recorded by police and
that Brand had ordered videotapes of the beatings erased.”62
In McAllen influential people expressed their concerns over the
negative press and the potential blot on the city’s good name. “The
tarnished image of the McAllen Police Department is going to take a
long, long time to be erased,” lamented the Monitor. “Lengthy stories
of misconduct by some members of the department have been given
extensive coverage” around the state and country. “The impression given,
of course, is that McAllen policemen, as a whole, are a gang of heavyhanded dispensers, of not only the law, but punishment too.”63 A
disgusted resident of Edinburg, named Al Ramirez, slammed the press
for its concern about reputation and its evident lack of concern about
justice. According to Ramirez, one public commentator “tearfully related
how sad it was that McAllen’s reputation had been smeared nationwide
‘since the area is so popular with tourists from all over the country.’ Yes,
that’s what he said. In other words, it’s SAD because it might [a]ffect
the local economy, the way Miami has suffered, but not SAD because
improperly supervised policemen systematically and consistently violated
the rights of citizens.”64
Although some McAllen residents had been aware of the police
violence since the mid-1970s, Harrington was the one who brought its
magnitude to light. A native of Michigan, he met and married Rebecca
Flores while both were students at the University of Michigan. “His
wife, who grew up in Texas,” was the director of the United Farm Workers
union in Texas, “and he is the union’s lawyer,” reported the Washington
Post.65 After nearly five years of litigation, he secured and introduced
into evidence in March 1981 eleven of the jailhouse videotapes, containing
nearly an hour’s worth of footage. Recorded over six years, these tapes
revealed dozens of beatings by police officers and a general disinterest
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among their peers to curb this misbehavior. “They just stood around,
watching the beatings or patiently worked on their reports, just like
nothing was happening. That’s truly an appalling thing.” Soon, reporters
gained possession of the tapes and Harlingen’s KGBT “ran the tapes
unedited, showing the scale of abuse and the often harsh and profane
language used by police.”66
Many Anglos—and more than a few Mexican Americans—stood
behind the department. “The issue of ‘police brutality’ seems to be
getting driven into the ground,” a resident wrote to the Monitor.67
Another condemned those who criticized officers, no matter their crimes.
By demanding a higher standard of conduct, he believed, critics aided
and abetted criminals. “If we think we have problems now with burglaries,
hold-ups and other violent crimes, just wait until it becomes generally
believed throughout the U.S. and Mexico that, in McAllen, the police
are restrained from using force in making arrest. That if they do, such
action can be construed as ‘police brutality,’ entitling the ‘victim’ to the
services of an eager-beaver civil rights attorney.” He added that the
imposition of constraints on the officers would “be a clarion call to all
the thieves and thugs north and south of the border to come to McAllen
to ply their trades.”68 Yet another opined that “the crimes committed
during the hours that ‘C’ shift is on duty are usually committed by the
dregs of society, drug pushers and addicts, alcoholics, bums, juvenile
delinquents, prostitutes, etc.”69
However, many Mexican Americans and some sympathetic Anglos
protested the violence. Harrington observed that the brutality was not
new; what was new was the evidence to prove it. In five years of filing
suits, he said, “no one believed us until they saw the videotapes.”70 In
a letter to the Monitor a police critic avowed that “McAllen must rise in
one loud indignant voice, and demand that the actions recorded by the
police department’s own camera be stopped.” He added that “we are
not living in Hitler’s Germany nor Communist Russia and our police
must not be allowed to act as if they were.”71 Speaking in Dallas in his
last official act, Ruben Bonilla, a prominent civil rights leader and the
outgoing president of LULAC, spoke out against the McAllen police
and its officials. “In a fiery farewell speech,” he “lashed out at recently
re-elected Mayor Othal Brand of McAllen” and called him “a ‘bigot’
and a ‘racist.’ ”72
For their part, police officers—including the many officers and
administrators who had played no role in the abuse—suffered a blow to
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their morale. “An outsider can feel the tension just standing in the [police
department] lobby,” observed the Monitor on April 27, 1981. “Behind
the scenes it’s even worse.” With the public clamor over the scandal “and
the publicity about civil rights of prisoners, many officers feel another
set of civil rights have been overlooked—theirs.” Following the release
of the tapes, several investigations, a series of resignations by administrators,
a steady drip of embarrassing revelations, and the opening of rifts within
the department, many officers felt trapped. “Right now you just get by,”
one told a reporter. “You do your job and go home, and you don’t make
any waves.”73
In November 1981 the Dallas Morning News reported that the federal
grand jury in Brownsville had completed its investigation and indicted
several former McAllen officers—Anglo and Mexican American—on civil
rights charges. In addition, the News indicated that the “Justice Department
is also said to be investigating whether city or police officials tried to cover
up the allegations of brutality, and whether tapes protected by a federal
court order may have been destroyed.”74 During the 1982 trials federal
prosecutors revealed some of the sordid details of the violence unleashed
against a number of prisoners by McAllen officers, including the excuse
proffered by a reluctant participant in the beating of a Mexican American
in custody: “You beat him. I can’t. I have too many lawsuits pending.”75

T h e M c A l l e n M u n i c i pa l E l e c t i o n , 1981
Even before the release of the MPD tapes, a coalition of Mexican
Americans organized to challenge Othal Brand in the 1981 municipal
election and to elect the first Mexican American mayor in the city’s
history. They began their work in January 1980 when McAllen officials
announced a plan to sell the McAllen General Hospital and to “let a
private company build a replacement before the hospital becomes a
‘taxpayers’ burden.’ ” Opponents argued that the agreement would
reduce indigent care and “force many paying patients to use other
hospitals after an expected increase in room rates and fees.” With many
impoverished residents (mostly Mexican American), they quickly realized
that they would not be able to afford a private facility because “this is a
chronically depressed economic area.” Those lining up against the sale
represented “poor Mexican-Americans of the area who would have to
seek medical help elsewhere for non-emergency cases.” The Dallas
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Morning News added that this “issue is one of the touchiest to divide
this border city in years.”76
Concerned over the threat to indigent care, Mexican Americans
launched a “massive voter registration drive” among poorer south side
residents. Jerry Polinard, a political scientist from Pan American
University, concluded three years later that “Voting in the ’80s has been
along ethnic lines…pitting the Hispanic south side against the north.”
When politicians decided to hold a referendum on the hospital issue in
1980, 6,500 additional Mexican American south side residents registered
and defeated the plan. “It was classic,” Polinard stated. “Since McAllen
is roughly 70 percent Mexican-American, the south side discovered the
importance of voter registration.”77 The Monitor shared Polinard’s
assessment. “This was the most highly organized city election campaign
in history,” it observed after the 1981 vote. “Both sides organized down
to the city block level to turn out the vote in an effort comparable to
that undertaken in presidential elections.”78
Once they had defeated Brand and his allies on the hospital issue, the
Mexican Americans targeted the twin objectives of defeating the
incumbent and electing one of their own in the mayoralty election. In
the so-called post-civil-rights period, they rankled over the racism that
continued to define the social order and grumbled that the Anglos,
though no longer expressing as much overt public racism, still regarded
them as incapable of governing. “The fact is that Mexican-Americans in
this city, as in almost every city in the Valley, have been excluded from
the decision-making, political process,” a prominent Mexican American
told the Dallas Morning News. “What is more, this exclusion has been
by design, not by default.” In essence, Mexican Americans largely believed
that “racism…is McAllen’s main political issue. And racist attitudes have
infused local politics.”79 César Chávez himself credited the hospital effort
as the catalyst for Mexican American activism in the city. Speaking in San
Juan, he pointed to the “defeat of a referendum to allow sale of McAllen
General Hospital as a ‘first trial run at political activity.’ ” Mexican
Americans “ ‘opposed the sale of the hospital and WE were victorious.
We took on the establishment and won,’ he said.”80
In January 1981 local farmworkers began a strike against citrus
growers. At that time they earned only $2 an hour. A union leader set
forth their demands. “The farmworkers want a guaranteed 8-hour work
day, wages of $10 a box for oranges and $8 a box for grapefruit. They
also demand fresh drinking water and toilets in the groves.” Two weeks
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into the strike they targeted McAllen mayor Othal Brand because of his
efforts to curb their activism. “Eleven Texas Farmworkers Union members
barricaded inside the office of McAllen Mayor Othal Brand vowed Friday
afternoon to spend the weekend there to protest the mayor’s refusal to
discuss their citrus strike.” He refused to meet with them. Instead, with
what one imagines as a wink and a nod, he claimed that he was only
mayor and had “never been a spokesman for the citrus industry.”81 With
his rebuff, the farmworkers and the residents of the “Hispanic south
side” who had defeated the hospital referendum earlier found a further
common cause in defeating Brand in the mayoral race.
For their part, Brand and his supporters, other agricultural interests,
and many middle-class Anglos (as well as some Mexican Americans)
rejected the charges of racism and attributed the ethnic peculiarities of
the local power structure to ostensibly race-neutral—but deeply
racialized—issues like hard work and know-how versus sloth and ignorance.
A prominent Anglo refused to give his name to the journalist who
interviewed him but he certainly embraced the views of many: “McAllen
is the best-run, cleanest, most attractive city in the Valley. It’s the city
tourists remember and want to visit again. And it’s no coincidence that
it’s run by an Anglo government.”82 As suggested by his refusal to lend
his name to this sentiment, most Anglos had by the early 1980s
internalized the color-blind discourse which came to dominate popular
American discussions of racism by the mid-1960s.
Reflecting this color-blind discourse, proponents of it were eager to
distance themselves from the “racism” which they defined narrowly as
the avowed bigotry and overt discrimination curbed by the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 and Voting Rights Act of 1965. Assuredly they did not
regard racism as structural, a system wherein resources and opportunities
flowed toward Anglos and away from minorities through a process of
unearned advantage. In declaring support for Brand, they were eager to
affirm that their decision reflected his ideas, not his race. “Let’s be positive
and realistic,” one declared, “and if the person we need to elect for our
own benefit is a Negro or Chinese, we must vote for that Negro or
Chinese, without taking [into] consideration ideology, race, or color,
but only considering who is the most qualified to occupy that position
so that our family can live in a more dignified way.” Lacking the requisite
Negro or Chinese, he endorsed Brand.83 Another Brand supporter
articulated her color-blind bona fides. “I don’t care if the mayor of
McAllen, the city commissioners, etc., are Mexican-Americans, white,
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black, or green with purple polka dots! I want what’s best for McAllen,
its citizens, its future. I want to vote for that man, whatever his color or
race!”84
The south side coalition selected as its candidate Dr. Ramiro Casso,
a leader in the fight against the hospital sale. The physician was a
recognized civil rights advocate devoted to the welfare of the most
oppressed. “Casso, 58, has spent much of his medical practice among
the poor and was honored [the day before the election] by the Texas
House of Representatives for his work among lower-income families,”
reported the Dallas Morning News.85 Casso had never held office “but
a victory…as the first Hispanic mayor of McAllen could put him in the
limelight of Mexican-Americans gaining political power in the Southwest.”
Casso urged the “Hispanic population of McAllen to turn out in force,”
charging that Brand ran “a government by the iron fist—government
by intimidation.”86
When the police scandal broke in late March 1981, Brand was in a
four-man election fight in advance of an April 4 ballot. On March 29
the Monitor addressed the impact of the scandal and his alleged role in
it. “During this current controversy, the big questions—shades of
Watergate—are whether or not city officials knew that a pattern of abuse
to prisoners was going on and whether there was an effort to cover-up
the wrong doing,” it mused. “The answer to either is difficult to
determine.”87 Based on the evidence, Brand had known about the abuse
since 1977 but had done little to stop it. Furthermore, he had attempted
to tamper with the evidence. On March 25 an official testified that Brand
had ordered him to destroy the videotapes. The official then added that
“the tapes were preserved because he checked with the city attorney who
told him to disregard the order.” The same witness recalled that the
mayor worried that “there may be some things on there and he was most
adamant about them being erased.”88 On March 26 Brand testified and,
even though he dutifully condemned the beatings, he hinted that the
suits were frivolous. “Brand wore a campaign button into the courtroom
but took it off before he took the stand. While on the witness stand, he
kept toying with his watch, and he gave long, repetitive answers to many
of Harrington’s questions.” Eventually, the judge “told Brand to ‘just
answer the question without a speech.’ ”89
In the days immediately preceding the election, Brand was limping
toward the finish line. To make matters worse, the mother of a youth
beaten by officers asked Governor Bill Clements to withdraw his recent
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nomination of Brand to the board of the Texas Department of Corrections,
the agency that supervised Texas prisons.90 Clements refused to do so a
few days later, declaring that he would not pull Brand’s name until he
knew more details. After all, he added, the mayor was “a very patriotic
American and a great Texan and a friend of mine.”91 Within a few weeks
Brand saw his nomination defeated, with the reelection fight and the
expanding police scandal significantly damaging his candidacy.92 As the
Monitor observed, “Probably Brand should have seen the writing on the
wall, and declined the governor’s nomination. But as we said before, the
mayor is a fighter.”93
After the vote on April 4 Brand claimed that “I’ve never seen the
ugliness before that I saw in the election today…. I never expected
anything like this. My home was besieged by threatening calls and apparent
attempts at entrapment.” He also claimed that he had been surrounded
at a polling place by Mexican Americans angry over police violence.94
For their part, Mexican American voters reported that they had suffered
intimidation in their efforts to vote. “Voter Juan Mena,” Election Inspector
John Lovelady observed in his report, “was told by one of the clerks ‘Si
no sabe leer y escribir ingles, que esta hacien aqui.’ (If you don’t know
how to read and write English, what are you doing here.) Mr. Mena was
going to leave without voting. One of the watchers observed this and
brought it to the attention of Mr. Arce. The judge (Arce) got Mr. Mena
to come back and vote.”95 Cary Hatch, another election inspector, wrote
that a voting “Judge was having trouble with his voting booth attendants;
who were rushing and generally bullying the voters if they did not vote
quick enough; these attendants would frequently enter the booth while
a vote was being cast to hurry the voter along.”96
While no candidate won the election outright, Brand and Casso
emerged as the runoff candidates. Mike Frost finished third and,
suggesting the preference of the “establishment” for an Anglo maverick
over a Mexican American, he threw his support to Brand.97 “ ‘I’m going
to support Mayor Brand 100 percent in the run-off in any way I can,’
he added. ‘He is by far more qualified than Dr. Casso, who’s not qualified
at all. I think my supporters will assist the mayor too.’ ”98
At a campaign event after the first election Brand (along with the Monitor)
explicitly noted the coming together of Anglos and the exact opposite
between many Anglos and Mexican Americans. “Noticeable in the crowd
was the number of former supporters of Commissioner Mike Frost, who
was eliminated,” the Monitor noted. “Mike and I are better friends than
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we ever were,” Brand stated to thundering applause. The mayor noted that
there was “ ‘a division occurring in our city I don’t like to see,’…charging
that ‘outside forces are at work within our city trying to gain control.’ ” A
Mexican American Brand supporter told the crowd that the “Casso forces
have been harassing and influencing our youth with hate.”99
With a runoff election set for May 10 between Brand and Casso, the
candidates jettisoned even the pretense of substantive policy stances and
embraced a divisive, no-holds-barred slugfest fraught with “ethnic
overtones.”100 Not surprisingly, Casso hammered away at the police
scandal, Brand’s involvement and, allegedly, his cover-up efforts, and
situated all of these within the context of racism and classism. “Brutality
has not completely stopped,” he declared. “Othal Brand has the power
to stop it, but he hasn’t.” These beatings, he added, had received national
attention thanks to the video footage which aired on television. With
some exaggeration the physician claimed that the tapes had “given the
city a bad name as the police brutality capital of the world.”101 On another
occasion Casso charged that Brand had “failed as mayor by allowing
problems to develop in the police department and by governing in a
divisive, intimidating manner.”102
At the same time, Brand and his supporters charged that Casso and
his surrogates colluded to ensure the release of the tapes to the media
as a means of damaging the incumbent. Brand noted that most of the
taped beatings occurred between 1974 and 1976 “and ‘it just happens
to come up now.’ ”103 Although their claims are easy to understand in
light of the political fight in which they were engaged, the federal judge
in the case favored full disclosure. Judge James DeAnda, hearing the
evidence on March 24, stated that the public should see the tapes when,
from a courtroom in Brownsville, he denied a motion by the City of
McAllen to bar their release. “They (the videotapes) are evidence in this
case and a public trial is fundamental in this country,” he said. “I don’t
intend to try…this privately. I don’t think I can.”104
Given the reputation of the Onion King as a man who, as Mr.
Agribusiness and as mayor, had done everything he could to stymie unions,
Casso and his campaign had little difficulty in portraying Brand as a
representative of Anglo repression. Many Mexican Americans shared the
view, later expressed by a civil rights leader, that Brand had run a “racist
campaign” typified by both racism and classism, and exemplified by
endemic violence against the Mexican Americans. Many of them believed
that Brand had made “McAllen ‘the laughing stock of the Valley.’ ”105 As
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the campaign got into full swing, Brand supporters took issue with such
charges. One fumed that “I hear more and more charges of racism being
leveled against our incumbent mayor.”106
In a further indication of the degree to which the color-blind discourse
expanded into the vacuum left by the collapse of overt racism, many
Anglos—choosing to forget their sustained and long-standing discrimination
against Mexican Americans—decried Mexican Americans for being racist
by raising the issue of historical inequality. In the Monitor a Brand supporter
castigated Casso for stirring up “ill-feelings between Mexican-Americans
and Anglos,” which, he believed, would profit from a period of benign
neglect. In an instructive twist he posited that race-obsessed Mexican
Americans would metaphorically lynch an innocent Anglo at the altar of
their invented suffering: “Don’t try to hang Othal Brand.”107
Yet, Brand continued to validate Casso’s charges. As the Washington
Post observed, he had recently attempted to overload the Human
Relations Board—intended to mediate inter-racial difficulties—with
fellow Anglos. “In appointing members of the human relations board
this spring,” it observed, “the city disregarded court requirements that
the board represent the economic and racial makeup of the city. McAllen
is 71 percent Hispanic and has one of the lowest per capita incomes in
the country, but the city attempted to fill its three slots on the fivemember board with Anglos.” The Post added that, “under threat of
contempt of court, the city altered its nominees.”108
By hammering the linkages between the physician and the United
Farm Workers and other civil rights and leftist organizations, Brand and
his supporters assisted Casso in his charges of racism. Brand told listeners
that “Casso’s campaign was controlled by the United Farm Workers and
other outside groups.”109 Although Casso and his supporters controlled
their campaign, they did in fact have strong links to rural Mexican
American laborers and the unions that fought for them. “About 1,000
members and supporters of the United Farm Workers” gathered in nearby
San Juan in early May to demand economic justice for agricultural workers
and pass a resolution commending Ramiro Casso for his “dedication to
the cause of the poor people.”110 With allegations of “outside influences”
attempting to “take over” the city, and with predictions of an impending
revolution, Brand’s reelection campaign reinforced his message with his
supporters. “Anyone can readily see who is backing, supporting and
organizing the campaign of Doctor Casso,” it blared. “Is this what you
want controlling your city government? Their sights are set on McAllen.

Hombres   ✜  809
No one can imagine the far-reaching implications that such a takeover
would have on our city.”111
Brand was so successful in painting his opponent as a revolutionary
that Casso soon found himself responding to the following question: “Is
it true that you intend to have a ‘Mexican take-over’ of City Hall?” That,
Casso replied, “is a false rumor.” Brand, he added, was spreading rumors
“to scare people into believing that an anti-Anglo take-over is about to
take place.” According to Casso, his campaign had downplayed the “ethnic
issue” but his “opponent wants to make an issue of Mexicans vs. Anglos,
because he feels that it is to his political advantage.” Brand, he charged,
“confused criticism with racism. He thinks that anybody who dares to
challenge him is divisive and backed by outside influences. If his opponent
is Spanish surnamed, then he is by Brand’s definition, a ‘racist.’ ”112
Underscoring the physician’s claims, Brand charged that Casso—who
advertised heavily on Spanish radio—used “the Spanish broadcasts to
muddy the race.” The Mexican American candidate “doesn’t dare to do
that in English” because, Brand claimed, “Casso appeals to racism
through his Spanish advertisements.”113 A Brand supporter placed the
blame for the racialized discourse at the feet of the challenger. “To simply
charge that Mayor Brand is a ‘racist’ is actually quite humorous when
one considers the colorful aspersions being cast by some of his critics,”
she wrote. “Smacks of a little racism (actually, a great deal of racism),
wouldn’t you say?” Anticipating that Casso supporters would claim that
only Anglos could be racist, she added: “Or doesn’t racism make a full
circle?”114 Another Brand supporter questioned the use of Spanishlanguage advertising at all, notwithstanding the large Spanish-speaking
population. “Are we in Mexico—can’t they speak English??”115
Casso may have appealed to racial solidarity on Spanish radio but the
evidence suggests that Brand supporters greatly exaggerated the matter.
In one instance Casso supporters issued an advertisement urging Mexican
American migrant workers to vote by absentee ballot prior to their
departure and incentivizing that request with a photograph of a Mexican
American youth and the emotive caption, “La Esperanza del Futuro”
(“The Hope of the Future”). A Brand supporter, however, provided an
alternative and entirely disingenuous translation. “Just this week, I saw
an ad in a Spanish language newspaper which pictured a young boy and
the words…‘This boy has no chance in life if Othal Brand is elected
Mayor.’ I am appalled at the picture being painted of Othal Brand as a
brutal and heartless man.”116
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Days before the initial election in April, Brand had charged that he
and his supporters had uncovered “large-scale voter registration fraud”
in the city, “including registrations by residents of Reynosa, Mexico, just
across the U.S.-Mexico border.” Notifying the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) and the Texas secretary of state, Brand told reporters
that a computer cross-check showed five hundred duplicate listings. “I
don’t think we’ve scratched the surface,” he said. The mayor claimed
that he had found the irregularities months earlier but had hesitated to
make the charge. “I didn’t want to polarize the community,” he asserted.
“But I wanted to send a message to the people of McAllen not to vote
illegally. What we want is a clean election.”117 Warning that offenders
would be charged with a felony, he called for “a ‘purge of the rolls,’ and
state legislation to provide more safeguards.”118
Not surprisingly, Casso and his supporters contended that Brand’s
accusations were “a campaign ploy and [that the] rolls are properly
constituted.”119 Nonetheless, both the state and federal governments
decided to dispatch election observers to monitor the vote. Undermining
Brand’s charges of widespread fraud, both the Texas secretary of state
and the Southwest Voter Registration Education Project (SVREP)
concluded that there had been no fraud during the April 4, 1981,
municipal election. In its press statement, the SVREP declared that “the
vast weight of the data leads us to the inevitable conclusion that Mayor
Brand’s allegations are a shameful attempt to appeal to the worst elements
in Texas politics. The allegations and hysteria raised by Mayor Othal
Brand are clearly designed to intimidate Mexican American voters from
participating in the electoral process.” There was, it emphasized, “no
fraud committed.” Given what it saw as Brand’s intimidation tactics, it
added that “we have asked the Department of Justice to send Federal
observers to McAllen to insure the integrity of the vote in the May 9,
1981 run-off.”120
Two days before the runoff election, Brand and Casso clashed in a
televised debate where “charges of racism and dirty politicking were
exchanged by the two candidates for mayor.” Interestingly, each pointed
to intermarriages within their families as evidence that they were “untainted
by racism.” Brand repeated his charges that Casso appealed to Mexican
Americans on racial grounds in Spanish-language advertisements. Casso
denounced Brand for “false charges of racism and unionism,” and charged
that the incumbent injected racism into every aspect of the voter drive.
“At the outset of the campaign,” the physician argued, “ ‘I ran ads
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imploring all candidates to refrain from using ethnic references’ but
Brand’s ads ‘talk about Anglo versus Mexican-American.’ ”121
Numerous sources reference the frenzy in McAllen in the days before—
and particularly on the day of—the election. “Never have there been
such hassles over the conduct of the election,” reported the Monitor,
citing numerous instances of disputes between election judges and poll
watchers over absentee ballots. “In fact, never before have there been
such crews of poll watchers. Schoolhouse polling places, inside and
outside, will be thick with them Saturday. Pressure was so heavy on
election officials that the absentee judge quit midway in the voting period
and was replaced by another.”122 The Monitor reflected on the tension.
“Is this the most heated, hard-fought election in the City of McAllen’s
history? someone asked the other day. Indeed, it is…[a] frenzied
atmosphere in the city.”123 On May 8 the Monitor reiterated that the
“most hectic local election campaign in the history of McAllen will reach
a climax…when thousands of voters participate in [the] run-off.”124
On May 10, Election Day, the tension exploded. A scuffle arose at
one polling place “in the early afternoon when someone threw a stick
at another trying to tear down campaign signs,” noted the Monitor. “In
the ensuing melee one participant’s face was badly cut. The affray brought
police officers and an ambulance.” At another polling place an official
requested that an officer be posted to prevent unrest. Elsewhere, officials
and observers reported that supporters for one candidate or the other
were blocking entrances to polling places. Around the city supporters
using trucks with campaign signs and sound equipment rallied supporters,
“honk[ing] their horns long and loud.” Brand himself claimed that
farmworkers surrounded him, calling him “Brand, the Nazi.”125 In his
comments on the state officials dispatched from Austin to oversee the
vote, Casso claimed that “there was an intimidating effect from the staff
members from the Secretary of State’s office, sent by [Governor] Bill
Clements to help his buddy [Brand] down here.”126 According to a
report in the Washington Post, Brand “used cameras from his company
to photograph voters on Election Day. He says he did it to obtain evidence
of vote fraud, but Mexican Americans believe he was trying to intimidate
uneducated, inexperienced Hispanic voters.”127
When the vote tallies rolled in, Brand defeated Casso 8,729 to 7,847.
Although the election reflected racial division, an unknown number of
Mexican Americans sided with the incumbent, a fact Brand emphasized.
“We had enough cross-over vote with all the ethnic overtones in this
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campaign. We had enough cross-over from the Mexican American
community to help us and put this town back together.”128 In fact, in a
report published on May 24 the Monitor found that the vote was “Not
on Ethnic Lines.” It concluded that “about 8,769 of the 16,632 voters
who participated were Spanish-surnamed and about 7,863 were so-called
Anglo American. Brand claimed Spanish support, and he had it, in
sufficient numbers to give him an edge.”129 Yet, the newspaper’s report
did not accurately reflect reality—the 1981 political campaign, intertwined
as it was with the MPD scandal, ripped McAllen apart along racial and
class lines.
The ugliness of the political race climaxed in its aftermath. “A mudslinging mayoral race has come to a bitter end with the loser denouncing
Mayor Othal Brand…after the incumbent won re-election despite
allegations of racism and covering up police brutality,” wrote reporter
Susan Stoler. In a speech to his supporters after the votes rolled in, Casso
roared: “Anybody that resorts to racial hatred to win an election is the
scum of the earth.” The next day, Brand retorted: “I’m just glad we won
after having seen my opponent on television after I came home last night.
Thank God we won.” Noting that so heated a campaign was something
of a novelty, the Oregonian mused that the “candidates exchanged charges
of racism and gutter politics in a city accustomed to quiet, polite
campaigns.”130 Polinard, the political scientist, later recalled that the
“ ‘1981 mayoral election was the dirtiest campaign I’ve ever seen,
including those I’ve studied in Louisiana’….Fear tactics and an us-againstthem attitude underlie all the campaign materials and ads.”131
The McAllen election—and the mobilization of working-class Mexican
Americans as a voting bloc—attracted the attention of observers across the
state and throughout the country. However, it seemed to irritate William
Murchison of the Dallas Morning News. Apparently suffering from amnesia
about either the Jim Crow which had governed Texas until the mid-1960s
or the persistence of intra-racial voting patterns among Anglos thereafter,
Murchison concluded that the enthusiasm of Mexican American voters for
a Mexican American candidate for “racial” reasons was sufficient proof that
the 1965 Voting Rights Act should be repealed. “America’s media have
discovered that next year the Voting Rights Act expires, unless Congress
steps in and renews it,” he wrote on May 28. “This has undammed a spate
of dewy-eyed articles, such as John Crewdson’s recent 3-hankie vignette
in the New York Times, wherein the Voting Rights Act is credited with the
enfranchisement of Dominga Sausedo, McAllen, Tex.”132
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Noting that Sausedo would not have been able to register or cast her
first ballot without the protections of that law (including its protections
for non-English speakers), Murchison wondered if it “would be so bad
a thing” if she remained voteless. “When [Crewdson] asked Mrs. Sausedo
to explain her vote for McAllen mayoralty candidate Ramiro Casso, ‘her
only answer was that he was “Mexicano.” ’ ” Since it had been sixteen
years since the anti-black police riot in Selma, Alabama, which brought
about the Voting Rights Act (expanded to protect Mexican Americans
in the Southwest in 1975), the News writer viewed that as sufficient and
then concluded with the following: “A decade and a half is long enough
to punish and browbeat a whole region. The Voting Rights Act must
die.”133 Like many Anglos Murchison had internalized color-blind
discourse and now regarded any reference to race or racism—even among
those who had been its victims for decades—as an act of racism.
Accordingly, he now regarded the Anglos in Texas and across the South
and Southwest as racism’s most recent victims.
In a tragic conclusion to the tumultuous spring of 1981, a burglar,
Raymond Beasley, in McAllen killed Officer Rosalin Suarez Jr. during
an attempted arrest, bringing “a flood of sympathy calls to a force deluged
all spring with outrage over the brutality tapes.”134 Not surprisingly,
many of those whose sympathies had always been with the officers used
the killing as a springboard to attack Harrington and the Mexican
Americans who had been the victims of the police. “On Wednesday, May
20, 1981, Jim Harrington had the gall and audacity to broadcast on
television that he was sorry for what had happened to Suarez,” wrote
an observer in the Monitor. “Harrington, you are just as much a part of
CAPITAL MURDER as the suspect…. You’ve destroyed many police
officers’ lives already by continuing to intimidate innocent police officers
who supposedly beat innocent (?) Mexican Americans. Have you ever
thought of defending an Anglo, Harrington?” She added that “as far as
you [Harrington] are concerned all ignorant, radical, uneducated, longhair, tatooed [sic] Mexican-Americans should be allowed to rob banks,
commit murder, rape and kill children, and abuse and kill police
officers.”135
Despite the voluminous evidence, jurors acquitted all of the accused
officers at trial. Victims and their sympathizers reacted swiftly. “Two
dozen plaintiffs have filed civil rights suits against McAllen police,
protesting the recent acquittals of three former officers on civil rights
charges,” reported the News on February 22, 1982. Harrington, too,
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expressed disbelief in the verdict: “Make no mistake about it, it was an
injustice.”136 Mexican Americans and their allies protested. “An estimated
crowd of 450 persons took to the streets of McAllen Sunday afternoon
in a ‘March of Solidarity’ against injustice and police brutality.” Reflecting,
perhaps, the recent killing of Officer Suarez, the organizers stressed that
they desired a nonviolent protest against police violence rather than
police officers. Also eager to avoid violence, MPD officers hung back,
dispatching only a handful of plainclothes detectives to disperse discreetly
among the marchers. The Monitor observed that some Brown Berets, a
Mexican American organization which promoted armed self-defense,
were at the event “in a minor show of force. Dressed in the traditional
brown uniforms and brown berets, all five ministers of the South Texas
delegation were present as security for the gathering.”137

Conclusion
Like their counterparts across Texas, McAllen officers routinely
assaulted Mexican Americans in the 1970s and early 1980s; unlike their
counterparts, those in McAllen were so confident in their right to commit
these crimes that they perpetrated them in front of a video camera that
recorded them. Although virtually every victim was a working-class
Mexican American, the officers, Anglo and Mexican American alike,
shared the implicit view that the prevailing racism and classism provided
a shield against public condemnations or legal repercussions. In their
assumptions they proved correct, not only over the years of documented
abuse but in the acquittal of every officer implicated in the beatings and
documented on video. Although violence by local police was crucial to
the enforcement of Anglo supremacy, scholars have focused narrowly
on the murderous actions of the Texas Rangers in the 1910s and on the
practices of immigration authorities on the border. Among its findings,
therefore, this study demonstrates the need for a greater emphasis on
the issue of police brutality, particularly at the local level, throughout
the twentieth century.
The events in McAllen highlight the complexity of social relations in
South Texas in the post—Jim Crow period. They demonstrate that
Anglos retained a lock on political and economic power and continued
to oppress Mexican Americans. They demonstrate, too, that more than
a few middle-class Mexican Americans shared not only Anglo contempt
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for those Mexican Americans who occupied the lowest economic strata
but also solidarity with the officers and the mayor. These events also
show that working-class and some middle-class Mexican Americans
forged a political alliance in these years based on their opposition to
racist oppression and they nurtured it over the next two decades until it
bore fruit in 1997 with the election of Leo Montalvo, the first Mexican
American mayor. Finally, the events exemplify how Anglos couched their
continued dominance in the emerging color-blind discourse that spread
across the U.S. in the 1960s by supposedly transcending racism and
privileging only merit, and by actually accusing the victims of racism with
racism for elevating the issue as a matter of public debate.
With its emphasis on the business and political life of the Onion King,
this study builds on the work of historians Timothy Bowman and John
Weber, who explore the rise of powerful, large-scale agribusinesses in
South Texas in the twentieth century and their development of racist
labor practices—including the exploitation of undocumented Mexican
immigrants—which eventually defined the region and spread across the
rest of the country. Given Brand’s lengthy and controversial tenure as
mayor, it provides a preliminary assessment of some of the volatile political
issues faced by him in the final decades of the twentieth century. Given
his extraordinary influence on South Texas and his complex legacy, Othal
Brand merits an exhaustive scholarly investigation.
This study contributes to the scholarship on the Mexican American
civil rights movement of the 1960s and 1970s, and demonstrates that in
McAllen, at least, it gathered steam in the early 1980s as residents came
to recognize their political power, first through their resistance to the
privatization of the hospital and then through their mobilization against
the reelection of Mayor Brand. As other historians have concluded, Mexican
Americans engaged more narrowly in political activism by the 1980s rather
than in the mass protests of the late 1960s and the early to middle 1970s.138
Nevertheless, as late as 1982 hundreds of Mexican Americans and
uniformed Brown Berets could still mobilize for such a march.
Finally, the study demonstrates the significance of the Voting Rights
Act—expanded in 1975 from the Deep South states to the Southwest—
in ensuring that Mexican Americans could mount their challenge to the
Anglo establishment in the first place. “McAllen, Texas, may be the best
place to start the debate on renewal of the Voting Rights Act,” declared
the Wall Street Journal after the runoff. “The runoff could have been
scripted by a liberal screenwriter: Othal Brand, the incumbent mayor of
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the scandal-plagued city with the nation’s lowest per capita income, is
an Anglo millionaire, the largest vegetable grower in Texas.” His
challenger, Ramiro Casso, was a Mexican American “supported by local
activists and Cesar Chavez’s United Farm Workers.” Although the Journal
conceded that “Mexican-Americans and other ‘language minorities’…
have indeed been victims of discrimination,” the conservative newspaper—
like Murchison—wondered if perhaps the “protection of the act of
voting” had become “subordinated to the goal of guaranteeing a minority
quota in the results.”139 Though drawing different conclusions, more
liberal observers writing in The Nation shared the same view of the
significance of the McAllen vote. “The election was marked by charges
of racism, police brutality and labor-baiting, and by allegations that
‘outside influences’ were trying to take over the government, and it left
deep scars in the body politic,” they wrote. “The election may have set
the tone for future area clashes between Anglo and Mexican-American
voters, and the tactics employed by the winner underscore the need for
the renewal of the Voting Rights Act.”140
Historians have rightly pointed to the landslide victory of Henry
Cisneros in the 1981 mayoral election in San Antonio as a moment of
tremendous significance because a Mexican American candidate defeated
the incumbent Anglo with a coalition of Mexican American, black, and
minority Anglo support, and became one of the first Hispanic mayors of
a major American city. “The election of Cisneros and the subsequent rise
of other Mexican American politicians were visible signs of a fundamental
shift in ethnic and class relations in San Antonio,” noted David Montejano.
“This new political order represented an ‘understanding,’ or convergence,
between Anglo business interests and those of the Mexican American
middle and working classes, with the former seeking support for their
economic proposals, and the latter seeking support for their political
ambitions.”141
Overlooked by historians, the mayoral campaign in McAllen adds
complexity to the story of political ascendancy for Mexican Americans
in 1981, reinforcing some and challenging other conclusions resulting
from the Cisneros victory. As in San Antonio, Mexican Americans
displayed extraordinary energy in supporting a Mexican American
candidate, in registering to vote, and then in casting votes—in record
numbers. As in San Antonio, Mexican Americans were eager to dislodge
the Anglos who for many decades had syphoned off political and economic
benefits for their own communities and denied them to Mexican
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Americans. Unlike in San Antonio, however, the Anglo candidate and
his supporters were successful in their appeals to racism and classism,
stymying the efforts of the activists. Unlike in San Antonio as well, the
Anglo candidate maintained his lock on the city leadership for another
two decades. As a consequence of this comparison of the similarities and
dissimilarities in the mayoral elections in McAllen and San Antonio in
1981, scholars can better appreciate the fervor and scope of Mexican
American activism in the early 1980s and at the same time remain
somewhat cautious about a sometimes-triumphalist narrative about that
period. The Nation made a similar point in its 1981 story: “Last spring,
when Henry Cisneros surprised Texas and the nation by easily and
peacefully winning the mayoral election in San Antonio, thus becoming
the only Mexican-American leader of a major U.S. city, things were quite
different 250 miles to the south in the city of McAllen.”142 <

Acknowledgments
I thank Walter Diaz, Evren Turan, Jerry Polinard, José Antonio
Rodríguez, Sean Visintainer, and Adela Cadena for their contributions
to this work. For a Faculty Research Grant in support of it, I thank the
Office of Global Engagement at the University of Texas Rio Grande Valley.

Notes
1. David McLemore, “Revelations of Beatings Place McAllen Police under
Spotlight,” Dallas Morning News, March 29, 1981, 38A.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. David McLemore, “McAllen Inquiry Widens,” Dallas Morning News,
May 3, 1981, 47A.
5. Marc Simon Rodriguez, Rethinking the Chicano Movement (New York:
Routledge, 2014), 57. See also Brian D. Behnken, Fighting Their Own Battles:
Mexican Americans, African Americans, and the Struggle for Civil Rights in
Texas (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2011), esp. 154–194;
David Montejano, Quixote’s Soldiers: A Local History of the Chicano Movement,
1966–1981 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2010), 131; Ernesto B. Vigil, The
Crusade for Justice: Chicano Militancy and the Government’s War on Dissent
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1999), passim; Juan Gómez–Quiñones,
Chicano Politics: Reality and Promise, 1940–1990 (Albuquerque: University of

818  ✜  J ournal

of the

S outhwest

New Mexico Press, 1990), 41; Juan Gómez-Quiñones and Irene Vásquez,
Making Aztlán: Ideology and Culture of the Chicana and Chicano Movement,
1966–1977 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2014), 202–204.
6. For a recent study of police violence against Mexican Americans in Texas,
see Brent M. S. Campney, “ ‘The Most Turbulent and Most Traumatic Years in
Recent Mexican-American History’: Police Violence and the Civil Rights Struggle
in 1970s Texas,” Southwestern Historical Quarterly (July 2018): 32–57.
7. Dan Balz, “Brutality Charges, Bitterness Haunt McAllen, Tex.,” Washington
Post, June 2, 1981, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/
1981/06/02/brutality-charges-bitterness-haunt-mcallen-tex/ddf97d23-83c9-4ca8a6fa-296caadff557/?utm_term=.2eb965318f4e [accessed August 10, 2017].
8. 1980 Census of Population: Volume 1, Characteristics of the Population,
Chapter A, Number of Inhabitants, Part 45, Texas (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Department of Commerce, 1982), 55.
9. Benjamin Heber Johnson, Revolution in Texas: How a Forgotten Rebellion
and Its Bloody Suppression Turned Mexicans into Americans (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 2003); David Montejano, Anglos and Mexicans in the Making
of Texas, 1836–1986 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1987), 117–119, 121,
125; William D. Carrigan and Clive Webb, Forgotten Dead: Mob Violence against
Mexicans in the United States, 1848–1928 (New York: Oxford University Press,
2013), 22–23, 85–86.
10. On the continual resurrection of Jim Crow indignities, see Behnken,
Fighting their own Battles, 37. On LULAC, see Craig A. Kaplowitz, LULAC,
Mexican Americans, and National Policy (College Station: Texas A&M Press,
2005); Cynthia E. Orozco, No Mexicans, Women, or Dogs Allowed: The Rise of
the Mexican American Civil Rights Movement (Austin: University of Texas Press,
2009).
11. Timothy Paul Bowman, Blood Oranges: Colonialism and Agriculture in
the South Texas Borderlands (College Station: Texas A&M University Press,
2016), 164.
12. Behnken, Fighting Their Own Battles, 106.
13. Quoted in Bill Moyers, Listening to America: A Traveler Rediscovers His
Country (New York: A Harper’s Magazine Press Book, 1971), 233, 234.
14. “An Open Letter from a Citizen Who Loves and Is Concerned about
McAllen,” Monitor (McAllen), April 30, 1981, 3A.
15. “Jurors Indict Valley Lawman,” Dallas Morning News, March 1, 1971,
12C.
16. “Bryan,” Brownsville Herald, December 30, 1970, 8.
17. “Angry, Shouting Chicanos March on Home of Sheriff of San Benito,”
Pampa Daily News, January 25, 1971, 2.
18. “Jury Finds Innocent for Deputy,” Dallas Morning News, April 30, 1971,
12A.

Hombres   ✜  819
19. “Murder in Pharr,” Grito del Norte (Las Vegas, New Mexico), February
28, 1971, 3. For more on police violence in Pharr, see David M. Fishlow, “Poncho
Flores is Dead,” Texas Observer, in “Chicano Collection,” Special Collections,
Archives, University of Texas Rio Grande Valley (F381- Hidaglo County—
Pharr—Pharr Riot, Copy 1).
20. “Massed Police Quell Youth Riot at Pharr,” Monitor (McAllen), February
7, 1971, 1.
21. “Murder in Pharr,” Grito del Norte (Las Vegas, New Mexico), February
28, 1971, 3.
22. Ibid.
23. “Chavez,” Monitor (McAllen), February 9, 1971, 3.
24. David McLemore, “Revelations of Beatings Place McAllen Police under
Spotlight,” Dallas Morning News, March 29, 1981, 38A.
25. David Hanners, “Former Officers Indicted,” Dallas Morning News,
November 5, 1981, 46A.
26. “Mexican-American Caucus Sees McAllen Police Tapes,” Monitor
(McAllen), April 29, 1981, 8A.
27. “Chavez,” Monitor (McAllen), February 9, 1971, 3.
28. David McLemore, “Revelations of Beatings Place McAllen Police under
Spotlight,” Dallas Morning News, March 29, 1981, 38A.
29. “People’s Voice,” Monitor (McAllen), May 6, 1981, 6A.
30. David Sedeno, “McAllen Mayor Controversial Character,” Seguin GazetteEnterprise, August 4, 1985, 7A.
31. “The Last Patrón,” Texas Monthly, July 1981, 86.
32. David Sedeno, “McAllen Mayor Controversial Character,” Seguin GazetteEnterprise, August 4, 1985, 7A.
33. “The Last Patrón,” Texas Monthly, July 1981, 86.
34. David Sedeno, “McAllen Mayor Controversial Character,” Seguin GazetteEnterprise, August 4, 1985, 7A.
35. Ibid.
36. “The Last Patrón,” Texas Monthly, July 1981, 86.
37. David Sedeno, “McAllen Mayor Controversial Character,” Seguin GazetteEnterprise, August 4, 1985, 7A.
38. Ibid.
39. “Frost Criticizes Brand’s Leadership,” Monitor (McAllen), March 26,
1981, 8B.
40. “The Law According to Othal Brand,” Monitor (McAllen), March 27,
1981, 3A.
41. David Sedeno, “McAllen Mayor Controversial Character,” Seguin GazetteEnterprise, August 4, 1985, 7A.

820  ✜  J ournal

of the

S outhwest

42. “Farmworkers Won’t Give Up Mayor’s Office,” Dallas Morning News,
January 24, 1981, 20A.
43. “The Last Patrón,” Texas Monthly, July 1981, 86.
44. Ibid.
45. “Violence Narrowly Averted in Field Hand Organizing Try,” Valley
Morning Star (Harlingen), May 30, 1975, 1.
46. David Sedeno, “McAllen Mayor Controversial Character,” Seguin GazetteEnterprise, August 4, 1985, 7A.
47. “The Last Patrón,” Texas Monthly, July 1981, 86.
48. “210 Farmers Arrested for Blocking Rio Grande Bridge,” State Times
Advocate (Baton Rouge, Louisiana), March 2, 1978, 9A.
49. “McAllen Police Praised, Hill’s Actions Criticized,” Dallas Morning
News, March 8, 1978, 19A.
50. David McLemore, “Revelations of Beatings Place McAllen Police under
Spotlight,” Dallas Morning News, March 29, 1981, 38A. For a list of some of
these cases, see “Suits and Plaintiffs against McAllen Police,” Box 1, Folder 7,
“Brand’s Defamations, 1981, 1983,” in Dr. Ramiro R. Casso Papers, 19602007,
Benson Latin American Collection, University of Texas Libraries, the University
of Texas at Austin (hereafter Casso Papers).
51. David Hanners, “Judge Denies Move to Bar Videotapes,” Monitor
(McAllen), March 24, 1981, 1A.
52. David Hanners, “Harrington Says City Aware of Misconduct,” Monitor
(McAllen), March 16, 1981, 1A.
53. David McLemore, “Revelations of Beatings Place McAllen Police under
Spotlight,” Dallas Morning News, March 29, 1981, 38A.
54. David Hanners, “Officers Said Trained to ‘Get Even’ with Prisoners,”
Monitor (McAllen), March 25, 1981, 1A.
55. “Police,” Monitor (McAllen), March 27, 1981, 10A.
56. David Hanners, “Officers Said Trained to ‘Get Even’ with Prisoners,”
Monitor (McAllen), March 25, 1981, 1A.
57. David Hanners, “Tapes Raise Question about Confiscated Pot,” Monitor
(McAllen), May 22, 1981, 3D.
58. “Memorandum,” August 2, 1978, [p. 1], Box 1, Folder 7, Casso Papers.
59. “Memorandum,” August 2, 1978, [p. 2], Box 1, Folder 7, Casso Papers.
60. George Kuempel, “McAllen Mayor Knew of Abuse, Lawyer Says,” Dallas
Morning News, April 10, 1981, 17A.
61. Memo by Gary Miller, Sergeant, Patrol Division, [undated], in Box 1,
Folder 7, Casso Papers.
62. George Kuempel, “McAllen Mayor Knew of Abuse, Lawyer Says,” Dallas
Morning News, April 10, 1981, 17A.

Hombres   ✜  821
63. “Image of Police Badly Tarnished,” Monitor (McAllen), March 29, 1981,
2C.
64. “People’s Voice,” Monitor (McAllen), April 14, 1981, 8A.
65. Dan Balz, “Brutality Charges, Bitterness Haunt McAllen, Tex.,”
Washington Post, June 2, 1981, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/
politics/1981/06/02/brutality-charges-bitterness-haunt-mcallen-tex/
ddf97d23-83c9-4ca8-a6fa-296caadff557/?utm_term=.2eb965318f4e [accessed
August 10, 2017]
66. David McLemore, “Revelations of Beatings Place McAllen Police under
Spotlight,” Dallas Morning News, March 29, 1981, 38A.
67. “People’s Voice,” Monitor (McAllen), May 7, 1981, 2E.
68. “People’s Voice,” Monitor (McAllen), May 5, 1981, 6A.
69. “People’s Voice,” Monitor (McAllen), May 6, 1981, 6A.
70. “Harrington Warns Police Brutality Will Continue,” Monitor (McAllen),
April 27, 1981, 3A.
71. “People’s Voice,” Monitor (McAllen), April 10, 1981, 2D.
72. “Bonilla Lashes Out at Brand in Speech,” Monitor (McAllen), May 17,
1981, 12A.
73. Marcia Caltabiano, “Situation Tense at Police Department,” Monitor
(McAllen), April 27, 1981, 1A. On the various investigations and restructuring
efforts, see Gail Sammons and Virginia Armstrong, “Police Board Is Changed
after Contempt Motion,” Monitor (McAllen), April 8, 1981, 1A; Virginia
Armstrong, “Makeup of Police Board Is Revised,” Monitor (McAllen), April 10,
1981, 1A; Virginia Armstrong, “Chief Picks Woman Officer,” Monitor (McAllen),
April 14, 1981, 1A; “White Promising Probe of Police,” Monitor (McAllen),
April 30, 1981, 1A; Virginia Armstrong, “New Police Training Program to Be
Implemented in June,” Monitor (McAllen), May 24, 1981, 3A.
74. David Hanners, “Former Officers Indicted,” Dallas Morning News,
November 5, 1981, 46A.
75. David Hanners, “Brutality Case Ends in Mistrial,” Dallas Morning News,
January 19, 1982, 8B.
76. “Hospital Sale Stirs Debate,” Dallas Morning News, January 7, 1980,
10A.
77. Sydney Rubin, “Hispanics Seek Mayoral Win in McAllen,” Dallas Morning
News, February 12, 1984, 52A.
78. Virginia Armstrong, “Election,” Monitor (McAllen), May 11, 1981,
12A.
79. Sydney Rubin, “Hispanics Seek Mayoral Win in McAllen,” Dallas Morning
News, February 12, 1984, 52A.
80. Juan Castillo, “Farm Workers Voice Plans to Be More Politically Active,”
Monitor (McAllen), May 8, 1981, 3A.

822  ✜  J ournal

of the

S outhwest

81. “Farmworkers Won’t Give Up Mayor’s Office,” Dallas Morning News,
January 24, 1981, 20A.
82. Sydney Rubin, “Hispanics Seek Mayoral Win in McAllen,” Dallas Morning
News, February 12, 1984, 52A.
83. “Letter to the Editor,” Monitor (McAllen), March 29, 1981, 3C.
84. “An Open Letter from a Citizen Who Loves and Is Concerned about
McAllen,” Monitor (McAllen), April 30, 1981, 3A.
85. “McAllen Re-Elects Mayor,” Dallas Morning News, May 10, 1981, 42A.
86. “Hispanic Runs Strong Race against Brand,” Dallas Morning News, May
9, 1981, 37A.
87. “Image of Police Badly Tarnished,” Monitor (McAllen), March 29, 1981,
2C.
88. David Hanners, “Officers Said Trained to ‘Get Even’ with Prisoners,”
Monitor (McAllen), March 25, 1981, 1A. Brand denied that he ordered the
erasing of the videotapes and claimed that “the only order to erase any tapes
involved phone calls in the police station. The city commission had passed an
ordinance earlier ordering that taping of all calls in and out of the station be
stopped, other than calls to the dispatcher.” Brand claimed that his concern was
with preventing warring factions within the MPD of recording one another’s
calls. See “Brand Denies He Ordered Police Videotapes Erased,” Monitor
(McAllen), March 25, 1981, 1A.
89. David Hanners, “Probe by Outside Agency Is Favored,” Monitor
(McAllen), March 26, 1981, 1A.
90. Gail Sammons, “Governor Asked to Withdraw Selection of Brand to
Board,” Monitor (McAllen), April 3, 1981, 1A.
91. Laurence H. Gross, “Nomination of Brand Defended,” Monitor
(McAllen), April 7, 1981, 1A.
92. On the Brand nomination, the police violence, the mayor’s withdrawal
and then his decision to face the confirmation hearings, and the opposition to
his nomination by State Senator Hector Uribe, see “Brand Nominated for Prison
Board,” Monitor (McAllen), April 13, 1981, 1A; “Brand Withdraws Board
Nomination,” Monitor (McAllen), April 27, 1981, 1A; “Tape Question Triggers
Confusion,” Monitor (McAllen), May 20, 1981, 1A; “Senate Panel to Make No
Recommendation,” Monitor (McAllen), May 21, 1981, 1A; “Uribe Says No to
Brand Nomination,” Monitor (McAllen), May 22, 1981, 1A; “Brand Raps Urbie
[sic] Action,” Monitor (McAllen), May 22, 1981, 1A.
93. “Hearing on Brand Was Cut and Dried,” Monitor (McAllen), May 24,
1981, 5A.
94. Virginia Armstrong, “Casso, Brand Face Runoff for Mayor,” Monitor
(McAllen), April 5, 1981, 1A.
95. John Lovelady, “Election Inspector Report,” April 4, 1981, 1, Box 1,
Folder 7, Casso Papers.

Hombres   ✜  823
96. Cary Hatch, “Election Inspector Report,” April 4, 1981, 1, Box 1, Folder
7, Casso Papers.
97. Ibid. On Frost and his supporters, see Virginia Armstrong, “Big Turnout
Seen for Mayor’s Race,” Monitor (McAllen), April 3, 1981, 1A. Frost enjoyed
the support of “the business community who dominated local politics for many
years” until Brand emerged as a formidable leader in the mid-1970s.
98. Virginia Armstrong, “Mayor,” Monitor (McAllen), April 5, 1981, 10A.
99. “2,000 Turn Out to Kick Off Brand Campaign,” Monitor (McAllen),
April 15, 1981, 12A.
100. “McAllen Re-Elects Mayor,” Dallas Morning News, May 10, 1981,
42A.
101. “Hispanic Runs Strong Race against Brand,” Dallas Morning News,
May 9, 1981, 37A.
102. “McAllen Re-Elects Mayor,” Dallas Morning News, May 10, 1981,
42A.
103. Virginia Armstrong, “Candidates,” Monitor (McAllen), March 27,
1981, 10A.
104. David Hanners, “Judge Denies Move to Bar Videotapes,” Monitor
(McAllen), March 24, 1981, 1A.
105. Marcia Caltabiano, “Protest March,” Monitor (McAllen), February 22,
1982, 12A.
106. “People’s Voice,” Monitor (McAllen), May 7, 1981, 2E.
107. “People’s Voice,” Monitor (McAllen), May 3, 1981, 12E.
108. Dan Balz, “Brutality Charges, Bitterness Haunt McAllen, Tex.,”
Washington Post, June 2, 1981, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/
politics/1981/06/02/brutality-charges-bitterness-haunt-mcallen-tex/
ddf97d23-83c9-4ca8-a6fa-296caadff557/?utm_term=.2eb965318f4e [accessed
August 10, 2017].
109. “McAllen Re-Elects Mayor,” Dallas Morning News, May 10, 1981,
42A.
110. Juan Castillo, “Farm Workers Voice Plans to Be More Politically Active,”
Monitor (McAllen), May 8, 1981, 3A.
111. “Now…Do You Have Any Doubts?” Monitor (McAllen), May 8, 1981,
3A. On Brand’s charges that “much of Casso’s support comes from ‘outsiders,’ ”
and particularly from the union, see Virginia Armstrong, “Vote,” Monitor
(McAllen), May 8, 1981, 12A, and “Who Is Really Mayor Brand’s Opponent?”
Monitor (McAllen), May 8, 1981, 3A.
112. “These Are the Questions People Are Asking of Dr. Casso,” Monitor
(McAllen), May 5, 1981, 3A.
113. “Hispanic Runs Strong Race against Brand,” Dallas Morning News,
May 9, 1981, 37A.

824  ✜  J ournal

of the

S outhwest

114. “People’s Voice,” Monitor (McAllen), May 7, 1981, 2E.
115. “People’s Voice,” Monitor (McAllen), March 1, 1981, 12C.
116. “Let’s Get the Facts Straight,” Monitor (McAllen), May 8, 1981, 9A.
117. “Voter Fraud Alleged in McAllen,” Dallas Morning News, April 1, 1981,
23A.
118. “Mayor Claims Irregularities Uncovered in Lists of Voters,” Monitor
(McAllen), March 30, 1981, 1A.
119. Virginia Armstrong, “Vote,” Monitor (McAllen), May 8, 1981, 12A.
120. “Southwest Voter Registration Education Project,” May 4, 1981, 1, 3,
Box 1, Folder 7, Casso Papers.
121. Gail Sammons, “Racism, Dirty Politicking Charges Exchanged by Mayor
Candidates,” Monitor (McAllen), May 7, 1981, 1A.
122. Virginia Armstrong, “Vote,” Monitor (McAllen), May 8, 1981, 12A.
123. Virginia Armstrong, “City of Palms,” Monitor (McAllen), May 3, 1981,
6A.
124. Virginia Armstrong, “City to Pick Mayor Saturday,” Monitor (McAllen),
May 8, 1981, 1A.
125. Virginia Armstrong, “Election,” Monitor (McAllen), May 10, 1981,
8A.
126. Virginia Armstrong, “Casso, Brand Face Runoff for Mayor,” Monitor
(McAllen), April 5, 1981, 1A, 10A.
127. Dan Balz, “Brutality Charges, Bitterness Haunt McAllen, Tex.,”
Washington Post, June 2, 1981, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/
politics/1981/06/02/brutality-charges-bitterness-haunt-mcallen-tex/ddf 97d2383c9-4ca8-a6fa-296caadff557/?utm_term=.2eb965318f4e [accessed August
10, 2017].
128. Virginia Armstrong, “Brand Captures New Term,” Monitor (McAllen),
May 10, 1981, 1A. The Wall Street Journal had a somewhat different take:
“Casso’s high Mexican-American turnout was beaten by an even higher Anglo
turnout.” However, it added, “Casso really lost the election in absentee voting,
which remains unfamiliar to Mexican Americans. Many of them in any event are
on the road as migrant workers, opening a question about the scheduling of the
election.” See “Voting Rights in the Valley,” Wall Street Journal, May 12, 1981,
22, Box 1, Folder 7, Casso Papers.
129. Virginia Armstrong, “Analysis Indicates Vote Not on Ethnic Lines,”
Monitor (McAllen), May 24, 1981, 5A. Although the figures in Armstrong’s
May 10 and May 24 stories are not the same, the latter reflect adjusted numbers.
130. Susan Stoler, “Texas Voters Pick Incumbent,” Oregonian (Portland,
Oregon), May 11, 1981, A10.
131. Sydney Rubin, “Hispanics Seek Mayoral Win in McAllen,” Dallas
Morning News, February 12, 1984, 52A.

Hombres   ✜  825
132. William Murchison, “It’s Time to Move On,” Dallas Morning News,
May 28, 1981, A24.
133. Ibid.
134 Dan Balz, “Brutality Charges, Bitterness Haunt McAllen, Tex.,”
Washington Post, June 2, 1981, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/
politics/1981/06/02/brutality-charges-bitterness-haunt-mcallen-tex/ddf 97d23
-83c9-4ca8-a6fa-296caadff557/?utm_term=.2eb965318f4e [accessed August
10, 2017].
135.“People’s Voice,” Monitor (McAllen), May 26, 1981, 6A. A friend of
the fallen officer bitterly linked the death of Suarez and “a recent rash of police
brutality lawsuits against McAllen police.” In law enforcement, he said, “we
can’t afford to hesitate one bit” because “[a]nytime you hesitate, even for one
second, you’re in trouble.” He concluded that it was possible that hesitation on
Suarez’s part “may have led to his death….‘With all these lawsuits, I think every
officer has this thing in the back of his mind….They get to the point where they
hesitate and ask, “Am I going to get sued or indicted or something?” ’ ” See
“Police Officer Killed,” May 19, 1981, UPI Archives, https://www.upi.com/
Archives/1981/05/19/Police-officer-killed/7911359092800/ [accessed
August 8, 2018].
136. “450 Protesters March for ‘Justice’ in McAllen,” Dallas Morning News,
February 22, 1982, 21A. A critic mourned that “ ‘most of the jury were business
people and few were Mexican-Americans,’ she said. ‘The jury did not represent
our community.’ ” See “March Called in Protest of Police Verdict,” Monitor
(McAllen), February 17, 1982, 1D.
137. Marcia Caltabiano, “Crowd of 450 Marches in Protest of Police Verdict,”
Monitor (McAllen), February 22, 1982, 1.
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